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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of different risk attitudes on the finan-
cial decisions of two insiders trading in the stock market. We consider
a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders. Insider 1
is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative exponential
utility. First, we analytically prove the existence of a unique linear
equilibrium. Second, we carry out a comparative static analysis with
respect to the duopoly case of risk-neutral insiders (Tighe (1989)) and
with respect to the duopoly case of risk-averse insiders (Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994)) models. Our findings reveal that the mar-
ket depth and the information revelation are higher in Tighe (1989)
than in our model. However, compared to Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1994), we find that the market depth depends crucially on the degree
of risk aversion. Finally, we show that regardless of the degree of risk
aversion, the stock price reveals more information in our model than
the stock price in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994).
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1 Introduction
Investors’ attitudes toward risk play a central role in their investments de-
cisions. Most of the literature about investors’ risk attitudes, considers two
types of risk tolerance: risk-neutral investors and risk-averse investors. In
a recent paper on risk preferences, Falk et al. (2018) conducts a study on
global variation in economic preferences in 76 countries and finds that there
is a substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, and that these
preferences drive the individual decision making. Our paper allows for risk
heterogeneity among the investors and studies the impact of such risk het-
erogeneity on their financial decisions in the presence of insider trading.
There is a large body of applied and theoretical studies of the insider trad-
ing problem and its impact on the financial markets. The importance of this
problem is highlighted by the policies adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and its push to investigate and prosecute those accused
of insider trading. The celebrated Kyle 1985-model gave a framework for
the study of insider trading and it has been extended in several directions.
Most of these extensions assume either risk neutral insiders or risk averse
insiders.1. This paper, is the first to our knowledge,2 to investigate the effect
of hybrid risk attitudes on the financial decisions of two insiders trading in
the stock market.
1For a detailed reference, the reader can check O’Hara (1995) or Vives (2010). Recent
extensions considered the one period model of Kyle and risk-neutrality of the insider,
include Jain and Mirman (1999), Daher and Mirman (2006, 2007), Wang, Wang and Ren
(2009), Zhou (2011), Kyle et al. (2011), Daher et al. (2012), Vitale (2012), Karam and
Daher (2013), Daher et al. (2014, a), Liu et al. (2017), McLennan el al. (2017), Wang
(2017) and Lambert (2018). Other extensions considered the dynamic settings of the
Kyle model. Among others, we cite Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Caldentey and
Stacchetti (2010), Daher el al. (2014, b) and Back et al. (2018).
2In a recent paper in the industrial organization literature, Mungan (2019) studied the
welfare analysis in the presence of two producers, one risk averse and one risk neutral,
sharing information regarding the cost of production.
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There are few extensions of the Kyle (1985) model to the case of risk-averse
insiders, we can cite for example Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and Sub-
rahmanyam (1994), Vitale (1995), Zhang (2004) and Baruch (2004). Except
Subrahmanyam (1991), in most of the discrete models, the comparative anal-
ysis studies were found numerically and this was due to the introduction of
the risk-aversion type of the insider which made the computational analy-
sis quite complex. Subrahmanyam (1991) extended the Kyle (1985) model
to the case of partially informed insider and proved analytically many of
her comparative analysis with respect to the risk-neutral case. Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994) extended Kyle’s (1985) multi-period auction model
to include multiple risk-averse informed traders with long-lived information.
Vitale (1995) generalized Kyle’s (1985) model to the case of a risk-averse
informed trader where the solution methods are based on LEQG dynamic
programming problems. Tighe (1989) extended Kyle model to multiple in-
formed traders, all risk-neutral. But none of these extensions, studied the
case of multiple informed traders with different risk attitudes. In this paper,
we investigate the effect of the risk attitudes of two insiders trading in the
stock market. We follow a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two
insiders. Insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative
exponential utility.
Our paper has two objectives. Similar to Subrahmanyam (1991), our first
objective is to prove analytically the existence and uniqueness of the linear
equilibrium of the model as well as carry out analytically all the compara-
tive statics analysis with respect to the duopoly static model of Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994) and to the risk-neutral insiders duopoly case studied
in Tighe (1989)3. It should be pointed out to the reader that in the risk-
neutral case, the normality distribution of the exogenous variables together
with the linear structure of the stock price, simplifies the existence and the
characterization of the linear Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, the comparative
statics analysis becomes straightforward. However, when the risk-aversion
structure is introduced, the computation of the linear Bayesian equilibrium
becomes less tractable and the analysis turns out to be more complex. In this
paper, we overcome much of the involved complexities and provide exact re-
sults for the equilibrium outcomes as well as the comparative statics analysis.
Our second objective consists in a rigorous analysis of the impact of different
3Our paper belongs to a research direction which is interested in proving the existence
(or not) and/or uniqueness of Kyle-type model equilibria. See for example, No¨deke and
Tro¨ger (2001,2006), Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010), Vitale (2012), Daher el al. (2014,
b), McLennan el al. (2017), Lamebrt et al. (2018) and Back et al. (2018).
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risk attitudes on the equilibrium outcomes, and mainly on market liquidity
and market efficiency. Liquidity is an important aspect of financial markets
for investors, researchers, and regulators. Vayanos and Wang (2013) sur-
veyed theoretical and empirical work on market liquidity in the presence of
six imperfections: participation costs, transaction costs, asymmetric infor-
mation, imperfect competition, funding constraints, and search. They found
that asymmetric information and imperfect competition increase the market
depth measure λ with respect to the full information and perfect competition
case. However, the relationship between market liquidity and risk aversion
has been given relatively less attention by academicians. As pointed out by
the European Central Bank (ECB) report in December 2007: ” the relation-
ship between risk aversion and financial market liquidity is usually found to
be negative-i.e. higher risk aversion is associated with lower market volatility-
the interdependence between the two is quite complex”4. Recent empirical re-
sults studied the impact of uncertainty on market liquidity. For example,
Chung and Chuwonganant (2014) showed the market uncertainty measured
by VIX, decreased the market liquidity in the US markets. Ma et al. (2019)
showed that increased risk perception (measured by VIX) reduces liquidity
around the world.
In this paper, we analytically characterize the relationship between the in-
siders’s risk tolerance and market liquidity. First, we show that the level of
risk-aversion affects the trading order of the risk-neutral insider. Indeed, the
different types of risk attitudes, induce a non symmetric equilibrium trad-
ing orders and both insiders orders depend crucially on the level of the risk
aversion. However, we show that regardless of the value of the risk aversion
coefficient, the risk-neutral insider order is always greater (in absolute value)
than the risk-averse insider order. Intuitively, this result is associated to the
fact that the risk averse insider trades less aggressively than the risk-neutral
one.
Second, our model reveals that similar to risk-averse Kyle type models (Sub-
rahmanyam (1991) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994)) the market liq-
uidity measure λ (defined by Kyle (1985) as the inverse of the market depth
measure), depends on the the level of risk aversion. When compared to
the Tighe (1989) model, i.e. when the two insiders are risk-neutral, we find
that the market liquidity is reduced in our model than in Tighe (1989). Intu-
itively, the presence of the risk averse insider in our model, drives the insiders
to trade less aggressively and thus reducing the market liquidity than in the
4For details, see [11]
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presence of two risk-neutral insiders (Tighe 1989). Note that this result is
consistent with the empirical work mentioned above.
However, the comparison between the market liquidity measures in our pa-
per and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) is not straightforward. We
show how the risk-aversion coefficient is a fundamental determinant of this
comparison as pointed out by the ECB report. Similarly to Subrahmanyam
(1991), we show that the market liquidity measure in our paper is unimodal
with respect to the level of risk-aversion, when it is compared to the case of
two risk-averse insiders (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994). In other words,
we found a benchmark level of risk aversion, above which the market liq-
uidity measure in our model is lower than the market liquidity measure in
the case of two risk averse insider. On the other hand, the market liquidity
measure in our model is greater than the market liquidity measure in the
case of two risk averse insiders for a level of risk aversion which is less than
the benchmark one.
Finally, we study the impact of different risk attitudes on price revelation.
We show that the equilibrium price in our model reveals more (less) informa-
tion than the stock price in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) (Tighe (1989))
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the model and
characterize the unique linear Bayesian equilibrium of the model. In section
3, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium outcomes
with respect to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Tighe (1989). All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders.
The economy consists of one financial asset. The underlying value of the
asset is denoted by z˜. The prior distribution of z˜ is normal with mean z¯
(assumed to be positive) and variance σ2z . The two insiders exhibit different
attitudes toward risk. We assume that insider 1 is risk neutral while insider
2 is risk averse with negative exponential utility and risk-aversion coefficient
A expressed as:
U(x) = −e−Ax.
The two insiders trade in the stock market based on their inside information.
There are three types of agents. First, there are two rational insiders, each
of whom knows the realization z of z˜. Second, there are the (nonrational)
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noise traders, representing small investors with no information on z. The ag-
gregate noise trade is assumed to be a random variable u˜, which is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u. Finally, there are K(K ≥ 2)
risk-neutral market makers who act like Bertrand competitors. We assume,
as in Kyle (1985), that the market makers observe the total order flow signal.
We assume that z˜ and u˜ are independent.
Following Kyle (1985), the trading mechanism is organized in two steps. In
step one, a linear pricing rule and optimal order rules are determined by
the market makers and the insiders, respectively, as a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. The market makers determine a (linear) pricing rule p, based on
their a priori beliefs, where p is a measurable function p : R −→ R. Each
insider chooses a stock trade function x˜i = xi(z˜), where xi : R −→ R is a
measurable function. In the second step, the insiders observe the realization
z of z˜ (random variables are denoted with a tilde. Realized values lack the
tilde. The mean of the random variable is denoted with a bar) and submit
their stock orders to the market makers based on the equilibrium stock trade
functions. The market makers also receive orders from the noise traders, all
these orders arrive as a total order flow signal y˜ = x1(z˜)+x2(z˜)+u˜ = x(z˜)+u˜.
The order flow signal is used by the market makers to set the price p˜ = p(y˜),
based on the equilibrium price function, to clear the market. The insiders
know only the value of z˜ and do not know the values of u˜ and y˜ before their
order flow decisions are made. Moreover, each market maker does not know
the realization z of z˜ but only knows its distribution. Finally, the market
makers cannot observe either x1, x2 or u.
The profits for each of the two rational traders are given, respectively, by
Π1 := (z˜ − p) · x˜1 and Π2 := (z˜ − p) · x˜2
This is a game of incomplete information because the market makers unlike
the insiders do not know the realization of z˜. Hence, we seek for a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium defined as follows,
Definition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a vector of three functions
[x1(.), x2(.), p(.)] such that:
(a) Profit maximization of the risk neutral insider, i.e. insider 1,
E[(z˜ − p(x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜))x1(z˜)]
≥ E[(z˜ − p(x′1(z˜) + x2(z) + u˜))x′1(z˜)] (1)
for any alternative trading strategy x′1(z˜);
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(b) Profit maximization of the risk-averse insider, i.e. insider 2,
E[−e−A(z˜ − p(x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜))x2(z˜)]
≥ E[−e−A(z˜ − p(x1(z˜) + x′2(z˜) + u˜))x′2(z˜)] (2)
for any alternative trading strategy x′2(z˜);
(c) Semi-Strong Market Efficiency: The pricing rule p(.) satisfies,
p(y˜) = E[z˜|y˜] (3)
An equilibrium is linear if there exists constants µ and λ, such that,
∀ y, p(y) = µ+ λy. (4)
Note that conditions (1) and (2) define optimal strategies of the two insiders
while condition (3) guarantees the zero expected profits for the market mak-
ers. The stock price, set by the market makers, is equal to the conditional
expectation of the asset value given their information. We restrict our study
to linear equilibrium. The normal distributions of the exogenous random
variables, enable us to derive and to prove the existence of a unique linear
equilibrium.
In the following Proposition, we characterize the unique linear equilibrium
of the model.
Proposition 1 In the presence of one risk neutral and one risk averse in-
formed traders, a linear equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is characterized
by,
(i) x1(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)(1 + Aλ∗σ2u)
λ∗(3 + 2Aλ∗σ2u)
and x2(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)
λ∗(3 + 2Aλ∗σ2u)
(ii) p(y˜) = µ+ λ∗y˜, where µ = z¯, and λ∗ is the unique strictly positive root
of the following quartic equation:
4A2σ4uλ
4 + 12Aσ2uλ
3 + (9− A2σ2uσ2z)λ2 − 3Aσ2zλ− 2
σ2z
σ2u
= 0. (5)
Proof : See Appendix A.
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Discussion of the equilibrium: First, note that the relationship between this
paper, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Tighe (1989) should be clear.
Indeed, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) considered the case of two risk-
averse insiders. Moreover, Tighe (1989) considered the Kyle (1985) model
with two risk neutral insiders. Hence, our model can be seen as a hybrid-
model in comparison with Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and with Tighe
(1989). Consequently, in this paper we will be able to show the effect of dif-
ferent risk-attitudes on equilibrium outcomes.
Second, it should be pointed out that our hybrid risk attitudes structure
affects the equilibrium trading orders. Proposition 1 shows that they are
not symmetric as in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and in Tighe (1989).
Specifically, the risk neutral insider (insider 1) trades more (in absolute value)
than the risk-averse insider (insider 2). Although both insiders are fully in-
formed about the realization z of the risky asset, we notice that the risk
neutrality dominates the risk-aversion in term of trading. Intuitively, this
result is associated with the fact that the risk averse insider trades less ag-
gressively than the risk-neutral one.
Third, Proposition 1 reveals the impact of the imperfect competition on the
equilibrium trading orders. Indeed, the order of the risk-neutral insider (in-
sider 1) depends on the risk-aversion coefficient A, i.e. insider 1 takes into
account all the possible decisions of insider 2 in her maximization problem.
Fourth, as in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), our model reduces to the
case of two risk-neutral insiders, i.e. it converges to the duopoly competi-
tion model of Kyle (1985), when the risk-aversion coefficient A converges to
zero.5 This is due to the fact, that in this case, the risk averse insider will
behave like the risk neutral insider and thus their trades become symmetric
and equal to the ones in the two insiders case of the Kyle (1985) model.6
On the other hand, when insider 2 is too risk-averse (A is large), Proposi-
tion 1 shows that the risk-averse insider (insider 2) has no incentive to trade
(x2(z˜) = 0) and thus our model converges to the one risk-neutral Kyle (1985)
model in which the order of insider 1 is equal to the one in Kyle (1985).7
To better understand this result, one should clarify the interdependence be-
5The risk aversion utility function adopted in our model converges to risk neutral one
when the risk aversion coefficient converges to zero (see Marks (2014)).
6See Tighe (1989) or Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
7As suggested by one referee, the results of this case will be stated in Lemma 1 and its
proof is relegated in the Appendix B.
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tween the risk aversion coefficient A, the liquidity market measure λ∗, the
risk neutrality and the market imperfection. Indeed, λ∗ can obviously be
seen as a function of A (see equation 5). Moreover, the expression of x2 in
Proposition 1, together with the fact that λ∗ is asymptotically independent 8
from A show that the risk-averse trades will converge to zero. Consequently,
the expression of x1 in Proposition 1 will tend to be equal to the single insider
trades as in Kyle (1985).
Note that our result (in the case of large values for A) differs fundamentally
from the case of 2 risk-averse insiders (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994)).
Indeed, in their case, the trading orders of the two insiders are equal and
both converge to zero for large values of A.9 The intuition for this result
is that when the insiders are too risk-averse, they tend to trade less aggres-
sively making higher the market liquidity. Consequently, as response to a
such increase, they have the incentive not to trade. However, the different
risk-attitudes of the insiders in our model, have different effects on their
corresponding trades. The risk-averse insider prefers not to trade in that
case. Taking into account of his/her decision, the risk-neutral insider ex-
ploits his/her private information and trades like the single insider of the
Kyle (1985) model. In the following Lemma (its proof is stated in Appendix
B), we summarize the effects of large values of the risk aversion coefficient
on the insiders trading orders.
Lemma 1 When the risk aversion coefficient A is too large, the risk averse
insider (insider 2) has no incentive to trade while the risk neutral insider
(insider 1) trading order is equal to the monopolistic insider trading of the
Kyle (1985) model.
Fifth, Proposition 1 reveals very interesting results about the risk tolerance
effect on the insiders trades, when the liquidity trades are too noisy (σ2u is
large). Similar to the 2-risk averse insiders model and to the 2 risk-neutral
model, the insiders’trades in our model are increasing with respect to an
increase in the liquidity trading noise. However, Proposition 1 shows that the
risk-attitudes and the market imperfection structure in our model, drive the
risk-neutral trading order to be linearly dependent on the risk-averse trading
order. Indeed, considering the ratio of the two insiders in Proposition 1, we
obtain
x1(z˜)
x2(z˜)
= 1 + Aλ∗σ2u (6)
8Lemma 3 shows that λ∗ is asymptotically convergent to the λ of Kyle (1985).
9We invite the reader to check Proposition 3 and Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
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Note that the relation between the insiders’ trades depend crucially on the
relation between the liquidity trading noise and the liquidity measure λ∗
through the expression λ∗σ2u. We show in the appendix that λ
∗σ2u is a linear
function of σu. Thus, an increase in the noise trades induces a non symmetric
increase in both insiders trades. Intuitively, in this case, we notice that the
risk neutral exploits his/her informational power to trade more aggressively
than the risk averse insider.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the risk-averse property has a direct
effect on the computation of the equilibrium outcomes and more specifically
on the market depth parameter λ. Indeed, considering the static version of
Kyle (1985) and its extensions when the insiders are risk neutral10 we noticed
that the market depth parameter is directly computed. On the other hand,
when insiders are risk-averse, the market depth λ is the solution of a quartic
equation.11
In the next section we develop the comparative static analysis. We will ana-
lyze the market depth and the stock price informativeness compared to their
corresponding expressions in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Tighe
(1989).
3 Comparative Statics
3.1 market depth parameter λ
In this section, we compare our market depth parameter λ to the ones in
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Tighe (1989). Lemma 2 shows that
market depth parameter in Tighe (1989) model is higher than the market
depth parameter in our model. However, the relation with respect to Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1994) is not straightforward. Indeed,
Lemma 2 The market depth parameter λ∗ in our model is greater than the
market depth in Tighe (1989). However, the relation with respect to Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1994) depends on the risk aversion degree and given as
10See for example Tighe (1989), Jain and Mirman (1999), Daher and Mirman (2007),
Wang et al. (2009), Daher et al. (2012) and Karam and Daher (2013). In Daher et al.
(2014, a), the computation of the market depth parameter is quite complex (but not a
solution of a quartic equation) due to the real market structure.
11See for example Vitale (1995), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), Subrah-
manyam(1991), Zhang (2004).
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follows.
(a)
λT ≤ λ∗
(b) There exists a risk-aversion coefficient level A∗ such that,

λ∗ > λHS forall A < A∗
λ∗ < λHS forall A > A∗
(7)
where λT and λHS refer to the market depth parameters in Tighe (1989) and
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) respectively.
Proof : See Appendix C.
Note that Lemma 2 plays a central key in providing almost all the results
in this paper. All the articles which extended the static Kyle (1985) models
with risk neutral insiders, found that the parameter λ was explicitly charac-
terized as a function of the exogenous variables of these models. However,
in the presence of risk aversion, the market depth parameter is implicitly
characterized as a solution of a quartic equation.12 Thus, most of the com-
parative results in the literature, were made numerically. But, in our paper,
the results of Lemma 2 are proved analytically and it will be used as foun-
dation to subsequent results of this paper.
Lemma 2 shows the impact of different risk attitudes on the market depth
parameter λ. In part a) of Lemma 2, we highlight the impact of risk-aversion
on the market liquidity measure in our paper when compared to the two risk-
neutral insiders case studied in Tighe (1989). Indeed, Lemma 2 shows that
the market depth parameter is greater in our model than in Tighe (1989). In
other words, when the two insiders are risk neutral (Tighe 1989), the market
is deeper (as defined by Kyle (1985) to be 1
λ
) than the market in the presence
of two insiders with one of them is risk-averse (our model).
12See Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), Vitale (1995) and
many related papers.
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Figure 1: The graph of λ as function of the risk aversion coefficient A when
σ2z = 1 and σ
2
u = 2
In Figure 1, we plot the market depth parameter λ as a function of the
risk aversion coefficient A. Obviously, the depth parameter in Kyle (1985)
denoted by λK and the depth parameter in Tighe (1989) denoted by λT cor-
respond to the case when A = 0 and they are both represented by horizontal
lines. We notice that the depth parameter λ∗ in our model lies between λK
(the risk neutral monopoly insider model) and λT (the risk neutral duopoly
insider model). Note that in the risk-neutral case, an increase in the number
of the informed traders, decreases the market depth parameter (λT ≤ λK),
i.e. increases the market depth. Lemma 2 part a), reveals that this result also
holds when one of the insiders is risk-averse. In other words, we notice the
Cournot competition among the insiders will also increase the market depth
when we go from the monopoly case (risk neutral insider) to the duopoly
case (one of the two insiders is at least risk neutral).
However, Lemma 2 part a) shows that Cournot competition among the risk
neutral insiders (Tighe 1989) increases the market depth than in the presence
of Cournot competition among insiders with the hybrid risk tolerance (our
model). Intuitively, this is due to the fact the risk-averse insider trades less
aggressively than the risk neural one and thus decreasing the market depth
when compared to the two risk neutral insiders case.
We turn now to discuss the comparison between the market depth parame-
ters in our paper and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) model. Indeed,
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the comparison seems to be ambiguous and not intuitive. Specifically, fol-
lowing the analysis of part a) of Lemma 2, one expects that the presence of
the risk-neutral insider in our model will increase the market liquidity with
respect to the two risk averse insiders model of Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1994). But, the second part of Lemma 2 shows that this observation does
not hold. Instead, it shows the existence of a unique risk aversion coefficient,
A∗, before which the market depth parameter in our model is less than the
market depth parameter in the presence of two risk averse insiders (Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1994) model). Moreover, for the values of risk aversion
coefficients greater than A∗, the market depth parameter in our model is
greater than the market depth parameter in the presence of two risk averse
insiders. Thus, the risk aversion degree is a principal determinant of market
liquidity.
To better understand the effect of risk aversion on the market depth param-
eter, we decide to plot in Figure 1, additional to λK , λT and λ∗, λV which
corresponds to market depth parameter in the case of a single risk-averse
insider (Vitale 1995) and λHS that corresponds to market depth parameter
in the case of two risk-averse insiders both knowing the underlying value of
the risky asset z˜ (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994)).
Note that when A converges to 0, λV corresponds to λK in Kyle (1985).
Similarly the market depth parameter in our model and in Holden and Sub-
rahmanyam (1994) converges to λT (Tighe 1989) when A = 0.
First, it should be pointed out that Figure 1 shows that in the presence of
one risk-averse insider (Vitale 1995), the market depth parameter λV is al-
ways less than the market depth parameter in the case of risk-neutral insider
(Kyle 1985), λK . This result is reversed when we compare our model’s mar-
ket depth parameter λ∗ to λT (part a) of Lemma 2). Hence, the effect of
risk-neutrality on the market depth dominates the effect of the risk-aversion
on the market depth, when we add another risk neutral insider to Kyle model
(Tighe 1989) and to Vitale model (our model)
Second, part b) of Lemma 2 shows how the effect of risk-aversion on the mar-
ket depth parameter is crucial when we compare our hybrid duopoly model
to the risk-aversion duopoly model of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994).
Note that going from the risk-aversion monopoly case (Vitale 1995) to the
risk-aversion duopoly case (Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994)), Figure 1
shows that the market depth parameter in both models is not monotonic (in
contrast to the risk neutral case when we compare the market depth param-
13
Figure 2: Regions of comparison between λV , λHS and λ∗ as functions of σu
and σz, for A = 0.5, A = 4 and A = 8.
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eters in the monopoly case of Kyle 1985 and in the duopoly case of Tighe
1989) and more specifically, it is unimodal with respect to the risk-aversion
coefficient. Thus the impact of risk-aversion on the market depth is the key
point of this relation.
For this purpose, we derive in Figure 2, for three values of A (A = 0.5, A = 4
and A = 8), the regions of comparison between λ∗, λV and λHS. Figure 2
reveals interesting results regarding the impact of risk tolerance on the mar-
ket liquidity. First note that an increase in the risk aversion, reduces the
comparison regions among the market depth parameters of the three corre-
sponding models. Such result, on one hand, reflects the unimodal property of
the market depth parameters in the presence of only the risk aversion struc-
ture, i.e. the monopoly case, λV , and the duopoly case, λHS. On the other
hand, it reflects the monotonic property of the market depth parameter, λ∗,
in our model, as highlighted by the white area in the upper side of the each
of the cases’graphs .
Second, when A = 0.5, the dark black area representing the case in which
λV > λHS > λ∗ and the light black area representing the case in which
λHS > λV > λ∗ show that the market depth parameter in the risk averse
monopoly case, λV , is either greater than the market depth parameters in
the case of duopoly competition among the insiders (the dark black area ) or
greater than the market depth parameter in the case of duopoly competition
among the insiders with the hybrid risk tolerance structure (the light black
area). Intuitively, when A decreases the risk averse monopolist model tends
more closely to the risk neutral monopolist model. Hence, this will induce
an increase in the trading aggressiveness of the insider which in turn justifies
the increase in the market liquidity parameter λV . Moreover, remark that
when A increases, the dark black area and the light black area disappear
which reflects the effect of the risk aversion degree on the market liquidity.
It should be pointed out that Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) focused on
the effect of the dynamic structure of trading and compared their results to
the Kyle model. However, in the static case with 2 insiders, the relation
between λHS and λT is quite similar to the relation between λHS and λ∗.
In sum, the relation between the market depth parameters in the case of
monopoly (Vitale 1994 and Kyle 1985) is monotonic but it does not hold
when we consider the duopoly case (Tighe 1989 and Holden and Subrah-
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manyam 1994)(See Figure 1) .13
Consequently, we show that the market liquidity is directly affected not only
by the number of trading rounds (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994) or the
number of informed traders (Subrahmanyam (1991)), but also by the risk
attitudes of the insiders.
3.2 Information Revelation
In this section we discuss the information revelation in our model and com-
pare it to the results obtained in Tighe (1989) and Holden and Subrah-
manyam (1994). By adopting the same measure of information, i.e. the
conditional variance of the liquidation asset value given the total order flow,
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price reveals less information in the pres-
ence of 1 risk-neutral and 1 risk-averse insiders (our model) than in the
presence of two risk-neutral insiders (Tighe 1989). However, with two risk-
averse insiders (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994), the equilibrium price is
less revealing than in our model.
Proposition 2 highlights the impact of risk attitude on price informativeness.
First, it should be noted that the hybrid structure of the risk attitudes of the
insiders does not alter the relation of the price informativeness with respect
to the risk neutral case. Indeed, Proposition 2 shows that the presence of
two risk neutral insiders increases price revelation of information with respect
to our model in which one of the two insiders is risk averse. This holds in
Vitale (1995) model which considered the risk-averse monopolistic case and
compared the price revelation to the result in Kyle (1985). For the duopoly
case, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) also obtained the same result as
well. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that risk-averse insider trades less
aggressively than the risk neutral insider. Thus, pushing the price to be less
informative than the price in the risk neutral case.
The second part of Proposition 2 states that the stock price conveys more
information in our model than in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) model.
The intuition behind this result is not straightforward since the relation be-
tween the trading aggressiveness of the insiders in both models, reflected by
13Subrahmanyam (1991) found the same result with finite number of partially informed
traders and analyzed the impact of the number of the insiders on the market depth pa-
rameter.
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the market liquidity parameters, λHS and λ∗, is not monotonic (See Lemma
2). To better understand the origin of the relation between the information
revelation in our model and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), we com-
pare the information revelation results in Vitale (1995) and in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994). Recall that similar to our case, the relation between
λHS and λV is not monotonic (See Figure 1) and thus, checking their price
information results is quite helpful. Computing the conditional variance in
Vitale (1995) and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), we found that the
stock price in Vitale (1995) reveals more information than in the duopoly case
studied in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) regardless of the risk-aversion
level. This result shows that an increase in the number of risk-averse insid-
ers decreases the informativeness of the stock price regardless of the trading
aggressiveness of the market.
Back to our model, we noticed that the presence of risk neutral insider has a
direct impact on the price information revelation when compared to the two
risk aversion duopoly case studied by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994).
Moreover, similar to Subrahmanyam (1991), we found two common results
related to price efficiency. First, note that an increase in the variance of liq-
uidity trading decreases the price efficiency. This similarity shows that the
presence of the risk-averse insider has more effect on the price efficiency than
the risk neutral insider does. Second, it should be pointed out that price
efficiency is decreasing in the risk-aversion coefficient. In other words, when
insider 2 becomes more risk-averse (increasing the risk-aversion coefficient),
her trades are less aggressive. This effect has a direct increase on the market
depth parameter λ (Lemma 2, part b)) and thus reducing the price efficiency.
Finally, it is worth noting that our model highlights the impact of the risk
attitudes on the price efficiency. Indeed, although one of the insiders is risk
neutral, the price efficiency is directly affected by the risk-averse insider’s
behavior.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analytically proved the existence of a unique linear equi-
librium and examined the impact of different risk attitudes on the finan-
cial decisions of two insiders (insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk
averse) in a static version of the Kyle (1985) model. Modeling risk-aversion
in Kyle type models is quite complex and several assumptions are needed for
tractability results. For example we assume that the market maker receives
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one signal of information for, namely the noisy order flow. This assumption
is less appropriate for the case of security analysts, who are likely to possess
more diverse signals. We leave this as open question for future research.
From a regulatory perspective, our analysis shows how the impact the of risk
aversion on the insiders’decisions and equilibrium variables in a one shot game
is quite important while the dynamic models (see Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1994)) studied the impact of risk aversion on the equilibrium outcomes over
time. Such observation opens the doors to look more closely on understanding
the role of risk tolerance in the world of insider trading.
Appendices
Appendix A: proof of Proposition 1
We begin by the maximization problem of the risk neutral insider, i.e. insider
1. The decision rule of insider 1 is the function x1(z˜). The expected profits
after plugging the linear pricing function, become,
E[(z˜ − p(x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜))x1(z˜)] = E[(z˜ − µ− λ(x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜))x1(z˜)]
The first and second order conditions are
x1(z˜) =
z˜ − µ− λx2(z˜)
2λ
and λ > 0. (8)
We move now to solve the maximization of the risk averse insider, i.e. insider
2. The decision rule of insider 2 is the function x2(z˜)). The expected profits
after plugging the linear pricing function, become,
E[−e−A(z˜−p(x1(z˜)+x2(z˜)+u˜))x2(z˜)|z˜] = E[−e−A(z˜−µ−λ(x1(z˜)+x2(z˜)+u˜))x2(z˜)|z˜]
Using the normality and the independency of the noise traders orders u˜, the
first and the second order conditions are
x2(z˜) =
z˜ − µ− λx1(z˜)
λ(2 + Aλσ2u)
and λ(2 + Aλσ2u) > 0. (9)
Combining equations 8 and 9, we obtain
x1(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)(1 + Aλσ2u)
λ(3 + 2Aλσ2u)
and x2(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)
λ(3 + 2Aλσ2u)
(10)
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Regarding the price function coefficients, µ and λ, first note that the semi-
strong market efficiency together with linear price function assumption lead
to,
µ+ λr˜ = E[z˜|r˜] (11)
Evaluating the expectation on both sides of equation 11 and then applying
the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
µ+ λr¯ = z¯ (12)
where r¯ = x¯1+ x¯2+ u¯ = x¯1+ x¯2. Using equation 10 to find the expression of
r¯ and plugging the result in equation 12, we obtain
µ = z¯ (13)
To complete the proof, it remains to find a unique value of the price function
slope λ. Indeed, note that the linear expressions of the insiders strategies
decisions, x˜1 and x˜2, induce the normality distribution of the total order flow
r˜. Thus, by applying the projection theorem to equation 11, we have
λ =
cov(z˜, r˜)
var(r˜)
(14)
Evaluating the right-hand side of equation 14 and after certain arrangement
we find that λ is a root of the following quadric equation
4A2σ4uλ
4 + 12Aσ2uλ
3 + (9− A2σ2uσ2z)λ2 − 3Aσ2zλ− 2
σ2z
σ2u
= 0. (15)
By Descartes’ rule of signs,14 there is only one positive root satisfying the
second order condition which ends the proof.
Appendix B: proof of Lemma 1
We first prove the results of Lemma 3 which will be used in many of the
subsequent proofs. It should be pointed out that Lemma 3 provides a quan-
titative characterization for λ as function of A.
Lemma 3 The following statements hold
14(Theorem: Descartes’rule of signs) If the terms of a single variable polynomial
with real coefficients are ordered by descending variable exponent, then the number of
positive roots of the polynomial is either equal to the number of sign differences between
consecutive nonzero coefficients, or less than it by a multiple of two.
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i) λ =
1
2
σz
σu
is an asymptote in the (A, λ) plane. Moreover, the curve
defined by equation 5, will not cross its asymptote.
ii) λ is increasing in A.
Proof of i). To find the asymptote, we view the quartic (equation 5)
f (λ,A) = 4A2σ4uλ
4+12Aσ2uλ
3+
(
9− A2σ2uσ2z
)
λ2− 3Aσ2zλ− 2
σ2z
σ2u
= 0, (16)
as a plane algebraic curve.
Note that most of the curves represented by f (λ,A; σz, σu) are irreducible.
We work under this assumption. The projective curve corresponding to the
affine curve f = 0 is
F (λ,A, Z) = 4A2σ4uλ
4+12Aσ2uλ
3Z2+
(
9Z4 − A2σ2uσ2zZ2
)
λ2−3Aσ2zλZ4−2
σ2z
σ2u
Z6 = 0.
(17)
It is not difficult to see that this projective curve has the singular points
(0 : 1 : 0) and (1 : 0 : 0). Now, we consider the affine view Z = 1. Put Z = 0
into the equation (17) to get A2λ4 = 0. So the points (1 : 0 : 0) and (0 : 1 : 0)
are at infinity. The second of these points is on the A-axis, and as noted
above it is singular. Set A = 1 in the equation of the projective curve (17),
we thus obtain the affine curve
4σ4uλ
4 + 12σ2uλ
3Z2 +
(
9Z4 − σ2uσ2zZ2
)
λ2 − 3σ2zλZ4 − 2
σ2z
σ2u
Z6 = 0.
The lower order terms 4σ4uλ
4 − σ2uσ2zZ2λ2 give us the distinct tangents λ =
0, λ = 1
2
σz
Z
σu
, λ = −1
2
σz
Z
σu
. Now dehomogenize to obtain, for λ > 0, the affine
asymptote λ = σz
2σu
.
Next we show that the curve will not cross its asymptote. The equation of
the affine curve above (16) can be written as
(
4σ2uλ
2 − σ2z
)((
σ2uλA+ 3
)
λA+
2
σ2u
)
= −λ2 < 0.
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This then implies that 4σ2uλ
2 − σ2z < 0, and so λ < σz2σu for λ > 0.
Proof of ii) In this part of the proof, we show that λ is increasing with
respect to A where σu and σz are treated as parameters. By implicit differ-
entiation, we obtain
dλ
dA
= −
∂f
∂A
∂f
∂λ
,
where ∂f
∂λ
must not be zero. It is then simple to find that
dλ
dA
=
−8Aσ4uλ4 − 12σ2uλ3 + 2Aσ2uσ2zλ2 + 3σ2zλ
16A2σ4uλ
3 + 36Aσ2uλ
2 + 2 (9− A2σ2uσ2z)λ− 3Aσ2z
.
Note that the numerator has one positive root - by Descartes’ rule (since we
are interested in A ≥ 0). Now factor the expression, and so we have
dλ
dA
=
−λ (2σuλ− σz) (2σuλ+ σz) (2λAσ2u + 3)
(2λAσ2u + 3) (8Aσ
2
uλ
2 + 6λ− Aσ2z)
= −λ (2σuλ− σz) 2σuλ+ σz
8Aσ2uλ
2 + 6λ− Aσ2z
Clearly, dλ
dA
> 0 if 2σuλ − σz < 0, or λ < σz2σu and provided that 8Aσ2uλ2 +
6λ− Aσ2z > 0.
Consider the upper bound (from part i)) to see what is the value of f (λ,A)
for this value of λ. The evaluation gives that,
4A2σ4u
(
σz
2σu
)4
+12Aσ2u
(
σz
2σu
)3
+
(
9− A2σ2uσ2z
)( σz
2σu
)2
−3Aσ2z
(
σz
2σu
)
−2σ
2
z
σ2u
=
1
4
σ2z
σ2u
> 0.
On the other hand, for λ =
√
2σz
3σu
, we have
4A2σ4u
(√
2σz
3σu
)4
+ 12Aσ2u
(√
2σz
3σu
)3
+
(
9− A2σ2uσ2z
)(√2σz
3σu
)2
− 3Aσ2z
(√
2σz
3σu
)
− 2σ
2
z
σ2u
= − 1
81
σ3z
A
σu
(
2Aσzσu + 9
√
2
)
< 0.
This shows that the unique root λ∗ is bracketed between
√
2σz
3σu
and σz
2σu
(by
the Intermediate Value Theorem).
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It remains to show that 8Aσ2uλ
2 + 6λ− Aσ2z > 0. Solve
8Aσ2uλ
2 + 6λ− Aσ2z = 0
for A, we get A = −6 λ
8σ2
u
λ2−σ2
z
. As we are interested in the part of the domain
where λ > 0 and A > 0, then we should have 8σ2uλ
2 − σ2z < 0. That is
λ2 <
σ2
z
8σ2
u
= 1
2
(
σz
2σu
)2
. But this is lower than the square of the lower bound
as
(√
2σz
3σu
)2
− 1
2
(
σz
2σu
)2
= 7
72
σ2
z
σ2
u
. Now as λ > 0, it is clear that
8Aσ2uλ
2 + 6λ− Aσ2z >
(
8σ2uλ
2 − σ2z
)
A.
As the lower bound on λ∗ is
√
2σz
3σu
, then 8σ2u
(√
2σz
3σu
)2
− σ2z = 79σ2z > 0. This
means r (λ,A) = 8Aσ2uλ
2 + 6λ−Aσ2z is positive on the domain of interest.
We turn now to prove the results in Lemma 1. Lemma 3 shows that λ∗ is
increasing with to respect to A and converges to σz
2σu
as A getting large. Note
that σz
2σu
is independent from A and thus it can be treated as constant in our
analysis. Hence, one can see that x2(z˜) =
(z˜−µ)
λ∗(3+2Aλ∗σ2
u
)
converges to zero as A
getting large. We show now that the trading order of the risk neutral insider
will converge to the one of Kyle (1985) model. Recall the risk neutral insider
order in Kyle model and in our model are respectively given by
x(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)σu
σz
and x1(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)(1 + Aλ∗σ2u)
λ∗(3 + 2Aλ∗σ2u)
When A is getting large and taking into account that λ∗ is treated as con-
stant (by Lemma 3), one can notice that x1(z˜) converges to
(z˜−µ)
2λ∗
. Since λ∗
will converge to σz
2σu
, replacing its expression in x1(z˜), we obtain the same
expression as in Kyle (1985).
Appendix C: proof of Lemma 2
Recall that the market depth parameter in Tighe (1989) is given by λT =√
2
3
σz
σu
which corresponds to our market depth parameter when A converges
to 0. Since we showed in Lemma 3 that λ∗ is increasing in A , the relation
in part a) holds.
We turn now to prove part b) of Lemma 2. Recall the one-shot game equi-
librium of the Holden-Subrahmanyam (1994) model.
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Proposition 3 (H.S. 1994) In the presence of two risk averse informed
traders, a linear equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is characterized by,
(i)
x1(z˜) = x2(z˜) =
(z˜ − µ)
λHS(3 + AλHSσ2u)
(18)
(ii) p(y˜) = µ + λHS y˜, where µ = z¯, and λHS is the unique strictly positive
root of the following quadric equation:
A2σ4uλ
4 + 6Aσ2uλ
3 + 9λ2 − 2Aσ2zλ− 2
σ2z
σ2u
= 0. (19)
We move now to prove the relation between λ∗ and λHS. Note that (19) can
also be considered as an algebraic curve g (A, λ; σu, σz) = 0, where σu and σz
as viewed as parameters. By implicit differentiation, we obtain
dλ
dA
= −
∂g
∂A
∂g
∂λ
,
where ∂g
∂λ
must not be zero. Thus, we have
dλ
dA
=
− (2Aσ4uλ4 + 6σ2uλ3 − 2σ2zλ)
4A2σ4uλ
3 + 18Aσ2uλ
2 + 18λ− 2Aσ2z
.
Note that the numerator has one positive root - by Descartes’ rule (since we
are interested in A ≥ 0); and we can write this equation as
dλ
dA
=
−λ (λ2σ2u (λAσ2u + 3)− σ2z)
λ (λAσ2u + 3) (2λAσ
2
u + 3)− Aσ2z
.
Observe that dλ
dA
= 0, implies that
λ
(
λ2σ2u
(
λAσ2u + 3
)− σ2z) = 0.
Solving this equation for A, gives A = − 1
λ3
3λ2σ2
u
−σ2
z
σ4
u
. Put this expression for
A into the quartic to find λ, we then obtain
λ = 1
2
σz
σu
or λ = −1
2
σz
σu
. Since λ > 0, we see that g (A, λ) = 0, for
(A, λ) =
(
− 1
λ3
3λ2σ2
u
−σ2
z
σ4
u
, 1
2
σz
σu
)
=
(
− 1
( 1
2
σz
σu
)
3
3( 1
2
σz
σu
)
2
σ2
u
−σ2
z
σ4
u
, 1
2
σz
σu
)
=
(
2
σzσu
, 1
2
σz
σu
)
.
On the other hand, solve (19) forA to obtainA = 1
2λ3σ4
u
(
−6λ2σ2u + 2σ2z ± 2
√
(−4λ2σ2uσ2z + σ4z)
)
.
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In order to have real roots, we need −4λ2σ2uσ2z+σ4z ≥ 0, that is −4λ2σ2uσ2z+σ4z
=−σ2z (2λσu − σz) (2λσu + σz) ≥ 0, or equivalently, (2λσu − σz) (2λσu + σz) ≤
0. This means that (2λσu − σz) ≤ 0, that is λ ≤ 12 σzσu .
So this bound is the maximal value of λ. By the analysis above, this happens
when A = 2
σzσu
. We now study the sign of dλ
dA
. If we evaluate dλ
dA
at A = 0,
we get
dλ
dA
|A=0 = − (6σ
2
uλ
3 − 2σ2zλ)
18λ
= −1
3
λ2σ2u +
1
9
σ2z .
Now when A = 0 , g (0, λ) = 9λ2 − 2σ2z
σ2
u
= 0, which has the solutions λ =
±1
3
√
2 σz
σu
. Since λ > 0, we get that
dλ
dA
|A=0 = − (6σ
2
uλ
3 − 2σ2zλ)
18λ
= −1
3
(
1
3
√
2
σz
σu
)2
σ2u +
1
9
σ2z =
1
27
σ2z > 0.
On the other hand, one can show that dλ
dA
|A= 3
σzσu
< 0. Thus, the derivative
at A = 0 is positive, and to the right of A at A = 3
σzσu
is negative. This
shows that the plane curve described by g (A, λ) = 0, has a max given by
(A, λ) =
(
2
σzσu
, 1
2
σz
σu
)
. So we can conclude that the algebraic curve g = 0
is unimodal. In fact, this can be verified by computing the second deriva-
tive of lambda with respect to A, which evaluates at
(
2
σuσz
, σz
2σu
)
, is equal to
− 1
128
(σz)
3(σu) < 0. This shows that it is concave down on the region con-
taining the maximum point.
Now, computing the first derivative of λ∗ with respect to A when A = 0, we
obtain
dλ∗
dA
|A=0 = −1
6
(2λσu − σz) (2λσu + σz)
= −1
6
(
2
(
1
3
√
2
σz
σu
)
σu − σz
)(
2
(
1
3
√
2
σz
σu
)
σu + σz
)
= − 1
54
σ2z
(
2
√
2− 3
)(
2
√
2 + 3
)
=
σ2z
54
> 0
This shows that the initial slope in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) case
is exactly twice that of obtained in our case. Consider now the difference
h = g − f , we get
h (A, λ) = λA
(−3Aλ3σ4u − 6λ2σ2u + σ2z + Aλσ2uσ2z)
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So to find the intersection of f and g, h must vanish. Then either λA = 0
or −3Aλ3σ4u− 6λ2σ2u + σ2z +Aλσ2uσ2z = 0. The cubic polynomial has one sign
change, and therefore, it has one positive root by Descarte’s sign rule.
We show in the table below that at A = 3
σzσu
, f < g, but that at A = 4
σzσu
,
f > g. It also shows the intersection point .
λ\A 3
σzσu
4
σzσu
3.5
σzσu
λ from f = 0 . 492 91 σz
σu
. 494 81 σz
σu
. 493 97 σz
σu
λ from g = 0 . 497 σz
σu
. 490 51 σz
σu
. 494 02 σz
σu
Note that the intersection point is roughly
(
A˜, λ˜
)
=
(
3.5
σzσu
, . 494 σz
σu
)
.
Summarizing, we have that
1) the initial slope of g is bigger than the initial slope of f ;
2) g is unimodal, it has one critical point which is a maximum occuring
at A = 2
σuσz
;
3) the intersection point of f and g occurs to the right of the maximum
of g, at roughly A∗ ≃ 3.5
σuσz
;
4) h = 0 at two points.
Then it follows that there is one point
(
A˜, λ˜
)
, where λ < λHS for A < A˜,
and λ > λHS for A > A˜.
Appendix D: proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the conditional variance in Tighe (1989) is given by
var(z˜|y˜) = 1
3
σ2z (20)
Computing the conditional variances in our model and in the Holden-Subrahmanyam
(1994) model, we obtain respectively
var(z˜|y˜) =
(
3 (1 + Aλ∗σ2u)
2
+ 2 (1 + Aλ∗σ2u)
)
σ2z − (λ∗)2 (2 (1 + Aλ∗σ2u) + 1)2 σ2u
(2 (1 + Aλ∗σ2u) + 1)
2 ,
(21)
var(z˜|y˜) = [(3 + Aλ
HSσ2u)
2 − 4]σ2z − (λHS)2(3 + AλHSσ2u)2σ2u
(3 + AλHSσ2u)
2
. (22)
25
We begin first by showing that (20) is less than (21). Indeed, combining (21)
with (15) and after some simplifications, the problem becomes equivalent to
show that
1
3
<
3 + 5Aλ∗σ2u + 2(λ
∗)2A2σ4u
(2 (1 + Aλ∗σ2u) + 1)
2 . (23)
Plugging the lower bound, λT , (the upper bound, σz
2σu
) of λ∗ found in Lemma
3 in the numerator (denominator) of the right hand side of (23), we obtain,
3 + 5Aσ2u
(√
2
3
σz
σu
)
+ 2
(√
2
3
σz
σu
)2
A2σ4u(
2
(
1 + A
(
σz
2σu
)
σ2u
)
+ 1
)2 < 3 + 5Aλσ2u + 2λ2A2σ4u(2 (1 + Aλσ2u) + 1)2 .
The left hand side simplifies to
1
3
+
((
15
√
2− 18)Aσuσz + σ2zσ2uA2)
9 (3 + Aσzσu)
2 >
1
3
.
This completes the first part of the proof. It remains to show that the
conditional variance in our model is less than the conditional variance in
Holden and Subrahmanyam model (1994). Indeed, combining (21) with (15)
and combining (22) with (19), the problem reduces to showing that
1 + Aλ∗σ2u
3 + 2Aλ∗σ2u
≤ Aλ
HSσ2u + 1
AλHSσ2u + 3
. (24)
In order to complete the proof, we need to show first the following result.
Lemma 4 λHS ∈
[
σz
4σu
, σz
2σu
]
Proof: Consider the equation
g(λ) = A2σ4uλ
4 + 6Aσ2uλ
3 + 9λ2 − 2Aσ2zλ− 2
σ2z
σ2u
, (25)
such that g(λHS) = 0. Note that
g
(
σz
4σu
)
= A2σ4u
(
σz
4σu
)4
+ 6Aσ2u
(
σz
4σu
)3
+ 9
(
σz
4σu
)2
− 2Aσ2z
(
σz
4σu
)
− 2σ
2
z
σ2u
=
1
256
A2σ4z −
13
32
A
σu
σ3z −
23
16
σ2z
σ2u
=
1
256
σ2z
A2σ2zσ
2
u − 104Aσzσu − 368
σ2u
.
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Consider the numerator A2σ2zσ
2
u − 104Aσzσu − 368 = 0. It has the solutions
A = 413+8
√
3
σzσu
= 107. 43
σzσu
or A = 413−8
√
3
σzσu
= −3. 425 6
σzσu
. Now, the derivative
d
(
1
256
σ2z
A2σ2
z
σ2
u
−104Aσzσu−368
σ2
u
)
dA
=
1
128
σ3z
σu
(Aσzσu − 52) .
So for 0 ≤ A < 52
σzσu
, the derivative is negative and g
(
σz
4σu
)
(at this value
only) is decreasing in A for 0 ≤ A < 52
σzσu
. As also for A = 0, g
(
σz
4σu
)
=
9
(
σz
4σu
)2
− 2σ2z
σ2
u
= −23
16
σ2
z
σ2
u
is negative, we can conclude that σz
4σu
is a lower
bound for λ. Similarly, it follows from what we had before,
A2σ4u
(
σz
2σu
)4
+ 6Aσ2u
(
σz
2σu
)3
+ 9
(
σz
2σu
)2
− 2Aσ2z
(
σz
2σu
)
− 2σ
2
z
σ2u
=
1
16
σ2z
A2σ2zσ
2
u − 4Aσzσu + 4
σ2u
=
1
16
σ2z
(Aσzσu − 2)2
σ2u
> 0.
Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, the proof of Lemma 3 is complete.
We turn now to show that (24) holds. Since the expressions in (24) are both
monotonically increasing in λ, plugging the lower bound of Lemma 4 in the
right hand side of (24), and plugging the upper bound of Lemma 4 in the left
hand side of (24), and then subtracting the resulting expressions from each
others, we obtain
1
2
2 + Aσzσu
3 + Aσzσu
− Aσzσu + 4
Aσzσu + 12
= −1
2
(Aσzσu)
2
(3 + Aσzσu) (Aσzσu + 12)
< 0. (26)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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